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FILLING THE IMMIGRATION VOID:
RODRIGUEZ-FERNA NDEZ v.
WILKINSON-AN EXCLUDED ALIEN'S
RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM
INDETERMINATE DETENTION
The United States has maintained a long and proud tradition as a haven
for the disadvantaged and for those fleeing persecution in other lands.'
Since 1921, however, Congress has taken measures to limit the number of
immigrants permitted to enter the United States.' Historically, the regula-
tion of this immigration flow has been virtually the exclusive province of
Congress.' Courts have consistently upheld the sweeping authority of Con-
gress to regulate immigration, even conceding that "over no conceivable
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over
the admission of aliens."4 To the extent that Congress has granted the ex-
ecutive branch the authority to deal with immigration matters, the
Supreme Court has recognized that "the power to expel or exclude aliens is
a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political
departments largely immune from judicial control."5 The Court has also
1. The United States immigrant heritage is a well-known subject of history textbooks,
political speeches, as well as a source of nationalist pride. Attorney General William French
Smith stated recently before members of Congress:
As President Reagan has said many times, quoting John Winthrop, '[W]e shall be a
city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us . . . .' Like a beacon, our
freedom still blazes forth in a world filled with too much darkness. That beacon
beckons the immigrant and the refugee to our shores--seemingly in ever greater
numbers.
Testimony of William French Smith, Attorney General, Before the Subcomm. on Immigration
and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, and the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
19 (1981).
2. Id at 1. Post-World War I conditions in Europe were such that millions of Europe-
ans sought to immigrate into the United States. The 67th Congress passed the first immigra-
tion quota law on May 19, 1921. This law limited the number of immigrants of any
"nationality [entering the United States] to three percent of foreign-born persons of that
nationality who lived in the United States in 1910." H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1666-67.
3. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981).
4. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v.
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
5. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953). See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787
(1977); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
Catholic University Law Review
invoked principles of international law in upholding the "plenary power"
of Congress over the exclusion and regulation of aliens.6
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952' represents an exercise of
Congress' "plenary power" over immigration matters. The Immigration
Act incorporates United States immigration laws relating to the immigra-
tion, exclusion, deportation, and expulsion of aliens.8 The Act classifies
aliens differently, depending upon a variety of factors. Under this Act,
aliens who have not been granted admission by visa or other means before
leaving their homeland and who come to the United States seeking admis-
sion are subject to proceedings to determine whether they may enter or
will be excluded. 9 Those who have already entered and who fall within
certain general classes of deportable aliens'0 are subject to "expulsion" or
"deportation proceedings" as opposed to "exclusion.""
(1952); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). As the Court in Harisiades observed:
"[Any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous poli-
cies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a
republican form of government." 342 U.S. at 588-89.
Lower federal courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead. See, e.g., Fernandez v.
Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980); Bassett v. United States Immigration & Natu-
ralization Serv., 581 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir. 1978).
6. E.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). These cases established the framework for the judicial principle
that the power to exclude aliens is "inherent in sovereignty, necessary for maintaining nor-
mal international relations and defending the country against foreign encroachments and
dangers--a power to be exercised exclusively by the political branches . . . ." Kleindienst,
408 U.S. at 765; accord Fang Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711. See also Rodriguez-Fernandez v.
Wilkinson, 654 F.2d at 1388.
7. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified in scattered sections of 8 & 50
U.S.C. (1976)) [hereinafter referred to as the Immigration Act].
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976).
9. Id § 1226(a). If the person is an alien, the immigration officer conducting the pro-
ceedings must determine whether the alien "belongs to any of the excluded classes enumer-
ated in section 1182." Id § 1225(a). These classes include, among others, aliens who are
mentally retarded, id § 1182(a)(1); aliens afflicted with sexual deviations, id § 1182(a)(4);
aliens afflicted with a "dangerous contagious disease," id § 1182(a)(6); alien paupers, id
§ 1182(a)(8); aliens convicted of a "crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely
political offense)," id § 11 82(a)(9); aliens who lack a visa or entry permit and a passport, id
§ 1182(a)(20), (26); as well as alien polygamists, id § 1182(a)(11); alien prostitutes, id
§ 182(a)(12); alien stowaways, id § 1182 (a)(18); alien anarchists, id § I 182(a)(28)(A); and
aliens who are members of or are affiliated with any communist or totalitarian party, id
§ 1182(a)(28)(C). There are numerous other categories which serve as grounds for exclusion.
See id § 1182(a)(1)-(31).
10. Id § 1251(a); compare id (deportable aliens) with id § 1182(a) (excludable aliens).
11. Id §§ 1251, 1251(b). "Deportation proceedings" are proceedings for expulsion
under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1260 (1976). The word "deportation" in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1230
(1976) is used in a nontechnical sense, simply meaning the process of returning an excluded
alien to the country from which he embarked to the United States. Leng May Ma v. Barber,
357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958).
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Under the Immigration Act, an "entry" is defined as "any coming of an
alien into the United States." 2 Therefore, aliens who have already come
into the United States--even though they may have been excludable at the
time of their entry,13 or may have entered illegallyl 4-- are subject to "de-
portation proceedings" rather than exclusion proceedings.' 5 To the alien
who has already entered, the Immigration Act provides rights and privi-
leges which are not available to the alien nonentrant seeking admission. 6
The courts have upheld these statutory distinctions, recognizing constitu-
tional protections available to deportable but not to excludable aliens. 7
The upheld provisions include sections of the Immigration Act which, be-
cause of their lack of specificity, permit government detention of an ex-
cluded alien without a time limit, while requiring expulsion of deportable
aliens within six months. '8 Despite statutory language that appears to indi-
cate Congress' intent that detention of excluded aliens under the Immigra-
tion Act be temporary,' 9 until recently the courts have not focused upon
12. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(13) (1976).
13. Id § 1251(a)(1).
14. Id § 1251(a)(2).
15. Id § 1252(b). See also supra note 11.
16. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. at 187; Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212. In
Mezei, the Court stated that once aliens have "passed through our gates, even illegally,"
they are entitled to the full protection of due process of law under the fifth amendment. 345
U.S. at 212. See also Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1395 (1953). For a discussion of the various
procedural safeguards extended to deportable aliens as opposed to excludable aliens, see
infra notes 35-49 and accompanying text. Ironically, the alien who properly seeks admission
in accordance with United States immigration laws and who is found excludable pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1976) is penalized for doing so by receiving fewer protections and privileges
than the alien who succeeds in entering the United States illegally by stealing across the
border. See also id §§ 1251(c), 1252(f).
17. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. at 187; Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S, at 212.
18. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1223(a), 1223(b), 1252(c) (1976); see also Rodriguez-Fernandez v.
Wilkinson, 654 F.2d at 1389.
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1223(a) (1976) contemplates the "temporary removal" of aliens from ship
to shore, for examination and inspection, even preserving the obligations of those in control
of the vessel to the removed alien passenger. Moreover, the removal of the alien is not con-
sidered a landing. In § 1223(b), while stating that the transporter must bear the expenses of
the alien's removal, Congress clearly indicated that it considers examination and inspection
equivalent to detention. In fact, § 1223(b) refers to payment of expenses during "removal to
designated place for examination and inspection or other place of detention and all expenses
arising during subsequent detention. . . until they are either allowed to land or returned to
the [transporter in the event of deportation]." Id. (emphasis added). See also 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1222, 1223(c), 1227(a) (1976).
Furthermore, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1976) clearly states that once an alien is excluded under
the Immigration Act, he is to be "immediately deported" by the vessel or aircraft bringing
him. This provision indicates Congress' intent that removal and detention under § 1223 and
§ 1225(b) be for the purpose of furthering inquiry into the qualifications of the alien to
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the issue of whether the government can detain an excluded alien for an
indefinite period pending unforeseeable deportation.20
Recognizing the absence in United States immigration law of a statuto-
rily- or judicially-imposed time limit to an excluded alien's detention, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Rodriguez-Fernan-
dez v. Wilkinson ,21 recently expanded the previously-limited due process
protections afforded an excluded alien to include freedom from indefinite
and arbitrary detention. By construing relevant provisions of the Immigra-
tion Act, the Constitution, and international law, the court attempted to
remove the open-ended nature of detention from the exclusion process.
The petitioner, Pedro Rodriguez-Fernandez, was one of the approxi-
mately 125,000 people who participated in the Mariel Boatlift, the so-
called "Freedom Flotilla."22 When the petitioner, a Cuban citizen, arrived
at Key West, Florida on June 2, 1980, immigration officials temporarily
removed him from the boat into the United States. While in the custody of
immigration officials, Rodriguez-Fernandez admitted in a sworn statement
that, when he left Cuba, he was serving a prison sentence for attempted
burglary and escape.23 Rodriguez-Fernandez's conviction for a "crime in-
remain in the United States. Once the alien was determined ineligible to enter, the purpose
of his continuing detention having been served, Congress intended his immediate deporta-
tion.
Congress, however, added a crucial qualification to its provision for temporary detention
pending a determination of the alien's admissibility. This qualification allows the Attorney
General to delay deportation if "in an individual case, in his discretion, [the Attorney Gen-
eral] concludes that immediate deportation is not practicable or proper." Id § 1227(a).
20. See 654 F.2d at 1385, 1388. The most closely related case prior to Rodrguez-Fernan-
dez is Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1952), where the Supreme Court upheld the 21-
month detention of an excluded alien. Id at 209. There are significant distinctions between
the two cases, however, which suggest that Mezei is not controlling authority for the facts
and issues presented by Rodriguez-Fernandez. Government efforts to deport the petitioner in
Mezei were ongoing, id at 208-09, as opposed to the discontinued efforts of the government
in Rodrigez-Fernandez. 654 F.2d at 1386. Furthermore, Mezei's exclusion and denial of
parole were based upon national security concerns, heightened during wartime, differing
materially from the factual circumstances in which the case of Rodriguez-Fernandez's de-
nial of parole came into question. Id at 1388. Finally, AMezei's primary focus was not upon
the constitutionality of indefinite detention as an alternative to the deportation of an ex-
cluded alien (not to mention one who is not shown to be a national security risk), but upon
the right of Mezei to a due process hearing. For a more detailed analysis of the Rodriguez-
Fernandez/Mezei relationship, see infra notes 144-70 and accompanying text. Rodriguez-
Fernandez is the first case to focus upon and examine the legal questions arising from the
indefinite detention of an excluded alien as an alternative to deportation.
21. 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
22. Id at 1384.
23. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 788-89 (D. Kan. 1980). The petitioner
admitted having committed several crimes in Cuba. He stole a suitcase in 1959, for which he
was sentenced to and served two years. He stole another suitcase in 1964, for which he was
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volving moral turpitude, '' 24 as well as the fact that he lacked immigration
documents (as did most of his 125,000 compatriots),25 prompted an immi-
gration officer's determination at a formal exclusion hearing on July 21,
1980 that the petitioner was an excludable alien. In accordance with 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (I.N.S.) or-
dered Rodriguez-Fernandez to be deported to Cuba.26 The Government of
sentenced to eight years, three of which he served before escaping. He was convicted of
attempted burglary in 1973, for which he was sentenced to four years. He received an addi-
tional three-year term for the escape. Rodriguez-Fernandez claimed that the theft convic-
tions were not serious because conditions in Cuba forced the citizenry to steal. He denied
being guilty of the attempted burglary, for which he was tried by a military tribunal. Id at
789. Petitioner testified that he was to be released from prison on June 27, 1981, when the
previously-imposed terms expired. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d at 1384.
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1976). There is a noticeable lack of explanation as to pre-
cisely what is a "crime of moral turpitude." Other than excepting a "purely political offense"
from the definition of this issue, the words "moral turpitude" are subject to the broadest
possible interpretations, unfortunately leaving a glaring opportunity for individual predilec-
tions to sway a decision of the admissibility of an alien or even of an excluded alien de-
tainee's qualifications for parole. See, e.g., Judge McWilliams' dissenting opinion in
Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1390-91 & 1391 n.2.
In Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), the Court held that any crime involving
fraud is within the scope of a crime of "moral turpitude," id at 224, as applied in the depor-
tation of resident aliens under § 19(a) of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, 39 Stat.
889, amended by 8 U.S.C. § 155(a) (1950). The Court recognized the difficulty in deciding
whether or not "certain marginal offenses" lie within the meaning of crimes of moral turpi-
tude, but nonetheless defended it from a "void for vagueness" attack, given the fact that
fraud has always been deemed to involve moral turpitude. 341 U.S. at 225.
For a discussion of the problems associated with various attempts to rescue the phrase "a
crime involving moral turpitude" from indefiniteness, as well as the need for a more specific
standard given the harsh penalty of deportation, see the dissenting opinion of Justices Jack-
son, Black, and Frankfurter in Jordan, id at 226.
25. Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 789. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9), (20) (1976). Only 2,000 of
the 125,000-130,000 Cubans were singled out for exclusion proceedings on the ground of
lack of proper immigration documents. Brief of the International Human Rights Law Group
as Amicus Curiae urging affirmance, Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382
(10th Cir. 1981).
In Soroa-Gonzales v. Civiletti, 515 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ga. 1981), the United States
District Court refused to entertain the government's argument of a lack of entry papers
required by 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) (1976) as a basis for revocation of the petitioner's parole.
Id at 1060 n.14. The court observed that the government "invited" over 100,000 Cuban
refugees into the United States knowing that those in the "Freedom Flotilla" would not
have proper documentation. Id at 1059 n.12. It stated that a revocation of parole for a lack
of entry papers would clearly be an abuse of the parole discretion "in light of the circum-
stances of the 'Freedom Flotilla' and the parole of over 100,000 others known to be lacking
such papers. . . ." Id at 1060 n.14. However, the court stopped short of deciding whether
the government "ought to be estopped by its own conduct" from using § 1182(a)(20) as a
basis for exclusion (as opposed to a revocation or denial of parole) of those Cubans who
have been paroled temporarily into the United States. Id at 1059 n.12. See also Fernandez-
Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 239, 242-43 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
26. 654 F.2d at 1384. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1976) reads in pertinent part:
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Cuba, however, refused all State Department requests to accept the peti-
tioner and other members of the flotilla.27 The Attorney General refused
to parole Rodriguez-Fernandez, and, consequently, his detention contin-
ued. The petitioner did not challenge the I.N.S. exclusion order either by
means of available administrative remedies or judicial review and was
confined in a maximum security federal prison for more than a year, some
of which was spent in solitary confinement.28
In September 1980, Rodriguez-Fernandez filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus, 29 which is the only available avenue for judicial review of a
final exclusion order.30 He was not contesting the validity of the exclusion
order itself, but only the validity of his detention.3' The United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Kansas determined that Rodriguez-Fernan-
dez's detention was arbitrary, constituting an abuse of the Attorney
General's discretionary power to detain an alien pending deportation, and
that the detention was prohibited under accepted principles of interna-
Any alien (other than an alien crewman) arriving in the United States who is ex-
cluded under this chapter, shall be immediatey deported to the country whence he
came, in accommodations of the same class in which he arrived, on the vessel or
aircraft bringing him, unless the Attorney General, in an individual case, in his
discretion, concludes that immediate deportation is not practicable or proper.
(emphasis added).
27. At the time of district court review of the case, the Government of Cuba had either
not responded or had responded negatively to six diplomatic notes sent by the United States.
The district court stated: "Thus, the Government has been unable to expeditiously carry out
the order of deportation and cannot even speculate as to a date of departure. No other
country has been contacted about possibly accepting petitioner." 505 F. Supp. at 789. See
also Rodripuez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1384.
28. 654 F.2d at 1385. Petitioner and approximately 230 other Cuban refugees were de-
tained at Leavenworth Penitentiary in a dormitory area separated from the general popula-
tion of prison inmates. They were designated to be on "holdover status." Petitioner testified
that conditions were more restrictive and privileges were fewer than for general population
inmates. Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 789. Subsequently, Rodriguez-Femandez was trans-
ferred to the maximum security federal penitentiary in Atlanta. The conditions of his deten-
tion were as severe as those applied to the worst criminals in the United States. Rodriguez-
Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1384-85.
29. Petitioner filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976). Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 788.
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (1976).
31. Rodriguez-Fernandez failed to seek judicial review of his exclusion order within the
six-month period allowed him under id § 1105a(a)(l) and therefore could not, and did not,
contest the exclusion order itself in his writ of habeas corpus. In what turned out to be a
critical element in the case, he chose to contest only his ongoing detention. He did not qual-
ify for a habeas corpus proceeding as provided by the Immigration Act, id § 1105a(9),
which limits judicial review to a deportation or exclusion order. The Immigration Act also
requires that administrative remedies be exhausted (which includes making a timely appeal
under § 1226(b)) before judicial review may be had under § 1105a(9). Id § 1 105a(c). Rodri-
guez-Fernandez, however, filed for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(1976) to challenge his detention.
Excluded Alien's Rights
tional law.32
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
upheld the district court decision, but went beyond it to establish new con-
straints, founded in constitutional law, restricting the Attorney General's
discretionary power to order the detention of excluded aliens subject to
deportation. The court held that domestic law, as well as international law,
guarantees the right of an excludable alien to be free from arbitrary, indef-
inite detention.33 This decision establishes a new standard entitling ex-
cluded aliens who are not security risks to be either deported or released
upon application following a "reasonable period of negotiations for their
return."34
This Note will examine the protection of the excluded alien from arbi-
trary detention as recently established in Rodriguez-Fernandez, weighing
its likely impact upon the government and excluded alien plaintiffs. It will
analyze the Immigration Act, common law, and international law to ascer-
tain what rights had previously been extended to excluded aliens and to
aliens in a position similar to the petitioner in the instant case. Focusing on
the Attorney General's discretionary authority to detain and parole ex-
cluded aliens subject to deportation, this Note will explore the develop-
ment of increasingly well-defined constraints upon the exercise of this
discretionary power over aliens, and will demonstrate how Rodriguez-Fer-
nandez is both a synthesis and an extension of this trend.
I. DIFFERENT VOICES: THE VARIOUS SOURCES OF ALIEN RIGHTS
UNDER UNITED STATES LAW
A. A Statutory Dichotomy. Excludable Versus Deportable Aliens Under
the Immigration Act
The Immigration and Naturalization Act35 has carefully maintained the
distinction between the exclusion and expulsion of aliens under the immi-
gration laws. The Act provides significantly different treatment and affords
significantly different rights to excludable and deportable aliens.36 For ex-
ample, the Act states that a deportable alien may be deported to any coun-
32. The district court found that Rodriguez-Fernandez's detention was arbitrary deten-
tion which violated customary international law as exemplified by the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the American Convention of Human Rights. Fernandez, 505 F. Supp.
at 795-99.
33. 654 F.2d at 1389-90.
34. Id
35. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 831 (1952) (codified in scattered sections of 8 & 50
U.S.C. (1976)).
36. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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try "willing to accept him into its territory,, 3 1 while an excluded alien
must be deported to the country from which he came. as
In expulsion proceedings, an alien is entitled to numerous procedural
safeguards not extended to aliens in an exclusion proceeding.39 Unlike the
excludable alien, the deportable alien is eligible for suspension of deporta-
tion, for voluntary departure,4" for adjustment of status,4 ' and for the tem-
porary withholding of deportation on grounds of persecution.42 Most
importantly, the Immigration Act authorizes direct recourse for the deport-
able alien to a court of appeals and an automatic stay of deportation pend-
ing judicial review.43 The excludable alien may have only judicial review
of a final exclusion order "by habeas corpus proceedings and not other-
wise" 44 and only after having exhausted his administrative remedies under
the Immigration Act.45
One of the procedural safeguards extended by the Immigration Act to
the deportable alien requires that the deportable alien's departure be
within a specified time limit.46 This provision allows the Attorney General
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1976).
38. Id § 1227.
39. Maldonado-Sandoval v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 518
F.2d 278, 280 n.3 (9th Cir. 1975). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), (c) (1976).
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976).
41. Id §§ 1255, 1259.
42. Id § 1253(h).
43. Id § 1105a.
44. Habeas corpus proceedings may be had by the excluded alien under § 1105a of the
Act, or be granted independently by a federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976) of the
habeas corpus statute. The latter was granted at the court's discretion by the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas. Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 788. Habeas corpus
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, unlike those under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a, were not a statu-
tory right to which Rodriguez-Fernandez was entitled. See supra note 31 and accompanying
text.
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1976). The Immigration Act provides that after a decision of a
special inquiry officer excluding an alien, the alien may make a timely appeal to the Attor-
ney General which stays final action until the Attorney General makes a decision on the
appeal. Id § 1226(b). The requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted prior to
habeas corpus proceedings under § 1105a is subject to the exception, described supra note
44, that habeas corpus proceedings may be granted independently by a federal court under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976).
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1976). When Congress passed the Internal Security Act of 1950,
Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987 (1950) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18,
22, 50 U.S.C.), and its successor, the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, Pub. L.
No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 50 U.S.C.), it was aware
of more than 3,000 warrants of deportation that could not be enforced because of the refusal
of countries of origin to grant passports for these persons' return. Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654
F.2d at 1389. Nevertheless, Congress provided in the Immigration Act for detention not to
exceed six months in deportation cases, indicating congressional concern that the detention
of these aliens be temporary and not an end in itself. See 654 F.2d at 1389.
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to deport a deportable alien six months from the date of the deportation
order or most recent judicial review. Since deportation or release is made
inevitable by this provision, it effectively bars extended imprisonment.
In contrast, the Immigration Act does not provide a specific time limita-
tion for the detention of an excluded alien. Instead, an excluded alien is to
be "immediately" deported to the country from which he came unless the
Attorney General, in his discretion, decides that immediate deportation is
impracticable or improper.47 Still, the Attorney General may, in his discre-
tion, temporarily parole excluded aliens into the United States pending
their deportation.48 Therefore, while the Immigration Act provides a gen-
eral rule of deportation of an excluded alien, the Attorney General has
discretionary power to take other action when certain conditions exist.49
Similarly, the judiciary has afforded Congress, which has in turn granted
the executive branch, broad discretion in its handling of immigration mat-
ters involving excluded or excludable aliens.
B. A Common Law Mosaic. Detention and the Rights of an
Excluded 4lien
As persons who have not entered and thus have "gained no foothold in
the United States," 0 excludable aliens have consistently been denied con-
stitutional rights that are guaranteed to citizens and alien entrants.5 ' Rec-
ognizing that Congress' power to legislate in immigration matters is
plenary 2 and that deportation is not penal in nature,53 the Supreme Court
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1976). For specific language of the statute, see supra note 26.
48. Id § 1182(d)(5). The temporary parole of excluded aliens also may be granted "for
emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest." Id Deportable aliens
may also be paroled by the Attorney General. Id § 1252(a).
49. As the district court indicated, the precise factual circumstances leading up to the
present case have been uncommon in the past and were unforeseen by Congress in its pas-
sage of the Act. Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 792. Accord Soroa-Gonzales v. Civiletti, 515 F.
Supp. 1049, 1055 (1981). Therefore, it would be highly likely, as in the instant case, that
where the country of the excluded alien's embarkation refused to accept the alien's return
and he cannot be set upon the vessel that brought him, that deportation would be impracti-
cable under the dictates of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1976).
Furthermore, Congress recognized that there might be some situations which would jus-
tify the temporary admission of excluded aliens for humane reasons. H.R. REP. No. 1365,
82d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1706. Certainly,
if an excluded alien suffered from a life-threatening injury, it would be neither practicable
nor proper to deport him immediately.
50. Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925), quoted in Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 189.
51. E.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Klein-
dienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 790.
52. See supra note 6. This plenary power has been described as a "sovereign right to
determine what noncitizens shall be permitted to remain within our borders." Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952).
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has repeatedly held that usual constitutional protections do not apply to
exclusion proceedings.54
In Carlson v. Landon,S the Court addressed the issues of detention with-
out bail and the due process rights of deportable aliens. Certain aliens had
been arrested and taken into custody vithout bail under warrants based on
sections 22 and 23 of the Internal Security Act of 1950,56 the predecessor of
the 1952 Immigration Act, which provided for the deportation of Commu-
nist Party members or those affiliated with the Communist Party.57 In dis-
cussing the constitutionality of deportation, the Court stated:
The power to expel aliens, being essentially a power of the polit-
ical branches of the government, the legislative and executive,
may be exercised entirely through executive officers, 'with such
opportunity for judicial review of their action as Congress may
see fit to authorize or permit.' Thispower is, of course, subject to
judicial intervention under the "aramount law of the
Constitution '58
The Court declared that "deportation is not a criminal proceeding and has
never been held to be punishment. ' 59 Rather, detention is a "necessary
part" of deportation, in order to prevent aliens arrested for deportation
from endangering United States interests.6".
Carlson upheld the rule that resident aliens detained pending deporta-
tion may be released on bond by the Attorney General should such release
be considered appropriate. This discretionary decision is then subject to
judicial review.6' The power to release deportable aliens is based on statu-
tory authority of the present and preceding Acts62 and on the rationale of
allowing resident aliens to rejoin the community owing to the "drastic"
53. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 236; Carlson, 342 U.S. at 536. Also, in Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), the Court declared that orders of deportation are not
punishment for crime. That deportation is not considered penal obviates the need for judi-
cial review and permits the detention and deportation of excluded aliens. Carlson, 342 U.S.
at 537-38.
54. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Carlson, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
55. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
56. Pub. L. No. 81-831, §§ 22-23, 64 Stat. 987 (1950) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18, 22 & 50 U.S.C.).
57. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 531.
58. Id at 537 (emphasis added).
59. Id
60. Id at 538.
61. Id; see also Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215-16.
62. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 528 n.5, 538. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1976). In addition to the
power to release under bond, the Act also provides the Attorney General with authority to
conditionally parole the deportable alien at his discretion. Id
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nature of deportation.63
The due process rights of an excluded alien, as opposed to a deportable
resident alien, were at issue in Shaughnessy v. Mezei.6' In Mezei, an alien
resident had left the United States and lived in Hungary for nineteen
months. Upon his return to the United States, he was ordered excluded by
the Attorney General on national security grounds.65 Mezei could not be
deported, however, and was detained at Ellis Island for twenty-one months
as an excluded alien.6
6
In its decision, the Court recognized its earlier rule that once an alien
has entered this country, even illegally, he can only be deported after legal
proceedings "conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed
in due process of law.' '67 However, the Court reaffirmed its position that
where the subject is a nonentrant, "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by
Congress [to determine exclusion and deportation] is, it is due process as
far as an alien denied entry is concerned. '6 ' The Court explained that in
this case the alien's temporary removal from ship to shelter ashore, under
what has now become section 1223 of the Immigration Act, was not dis-
positive. It was considered by Congress and the courts as only a temporary
arrangement, not as an entry into the United States.69 The Court observed,
somewhat paradoxically, that although Congress granted excluded aliens
only limited due process rights, statutory authority for temporary removal
and detention was in part the result of congressional sensitivity to the
hardships faced by aliens.7°
Finally, the Court determined that an excludable alien who is a national
security risk is outside the scope of the Attorney General's discretionary
power to release resident aliens on bond pending finalization of deporta-
63. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 537-38.
64. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
65. According to the Attorney General, the exclusion order was based on "information
of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest,"
and on a finding that the alien's entry would be a security risk. Id at 208.
66. All efforts to deport Mezei failed. Id He shipped out twice to return to the countries
from which he came, but France and Great Britain would not allow him to land. Id at 208-
09. The State Department unsuccessfully sought to arrange his readmission to Hungary.
Mezei himself applied for entry to many Latin American countries, but all refused him. So,
in June 1951, he informed the Immigration and Naturalization Service that he would dis-
continue efforts to deport himself. As the Court pointedly explained: "In short, respondent
sat on Ellis Island because this country shut him out and others were unwilling to take him
in." Id at 209.
67. Id at 212.
68. Id (quoting Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)).
69. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215.
70. Id
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tion proceedings.7 The Court in Mezei declared that the release of an
alien who is a national security risk is not protected by the immigration
statutes and fails to satisfy the general rationale for release.72
In contrast, the Court in Leng May Ma .Barber73 limited the applica-
tion of the Mezei decision to certain categories of excluded aliens. Con-
cluding that the Immigration Act provides that the granting of temporary
parole does not change the legal status of an excluded alien, the Court
stated:
The parole of aliens seeking admission is simply a device through
which needless confinement is avoided while administrative pro-
ceedings are conducted. . . .Physical detention of aliens is now
the exception, not the rule, and is generally employed only as to
security risks or those likely to abscond. . . .Certainly this pol-
icy reflects the humane qualities of an enlightened civilization.74
While the Court has encouraged detention only under circumstances
where necessary for protection of the public interest, it has distinguished
between certain forms of detention. In the landmark case of Wong Wing v.
United States,75 the appellants were found to be unlawfully within the
United States under the Chinese Exclusion Acts.76 A commissioner of the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan
ordered their imprisonment at hard labor for sixty days, to be followed by
deportation to China.77 A writ of habeas corpus was denied, and an appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court. The Court held that while orders of de-
portation are not punishment for crime and are within the congressional
71. Id at 215-16.
72. Id at 216. Moreover, the authority to parole excluded aliens, as created by the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952, did not apply in Mezei because the Act expressly
provided, in § 405(a), that litigation pending on its effective date, June 27, 1952, would not
be affected. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976).
73. 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
74. Id at 190.
75. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
76. As a result of a large influx of Chinese immigrants following the discovery of gold
in California (an estimated 200,000 from 1850 to 1880), Congress enacted the first of the
Chinese Exclusion Acts in 1882. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1952
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1661. The Chinese Exclusion Acts operated on two
classes of Chinese persons or persons of Chinese descent-those who came here with the
consent of the United States and those who did not. The Acts provided for the arrest of any
such individual found unlawfully in the United States 'upon a warrant issued upon a com-
plaint, under oath, filed by any party on behalf of the United States .. " Wong Wing, 163
U.S. at 229. See Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 1015, 25 Stat. 476, 479 (1888). Section 4 of the
Act of May 5, 1892 required the imprisonment at hard labor for up to one year, prior to
expulsion, of Chinese aliens unlawfully in the United States. 163 U.S. at 235. See Chinese
Exclusion Act, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892).
77. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 228.
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prerogative, the imprisonment of Chinese aliens at hard labor under the
Chinese Exclusion Acts was "infamous punishment" and thus violative of
the fifth and sixth amendments.7 The Court stated that for legislation au-
thorizing such imprisonment to be valid, it "must provide for judicial trial
to establish the guilt of the accused."79
Wong Wing established that temporary detention is permissible only to
the extent that it serves the necessary purpose of accomplishing deporta-
tion or exclusion."0 Subsequent federal circuit and district court rulings
have similarly held that deportable aliens in custody for more than a few
months must be released. After this time, detention is considered to be
imprisonment.8' Other pre-Immigration Act decisions involving deport-
able aliens have held that such aliens should be released if deportation is
impossible or cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future, 2 for the reason
that detention was intended by the Immigration Act and its predecessors
solely to effect deportation.8 3 Some courts stated that two to four months is
a reasonable period to detain an alien pending deportation efforts.84
Despite the trend evidenced by many of the decisions, domestic law has
not assured the protection of unadmitted, excludable aliens from lengthy,
perhaps indefinite, detention because of these aliens' special legal status in
78. Id at 228, 236-37. The fifth amendment provides in part that "no person shall be
...deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
V. The sixth amendment states in part that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crimes shall have been committed ... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
79. 163 U.S. at 237.
80. Id at 235; Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 791. See Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at
1387.
81. Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1387-88. As the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts declared in Petition of Brooks, 5 F.2d 238, 239 (1925):
The right to arrest and hold or imprison an alien is nothing but a necessary inci-
dent of the right to exclude or deport. There is no power in this court or in any
other tribunal in this country to hold indefinitely any sane citizen or alien in im-
prisonment, except as a punishment for crime. Slavery was abolished by the Thir-
teenth Amendment. It is elementary that deportation or exclusion proceedings are
not punishment for crime. . . .He is entitled to be deported, or to have his free-
dom. He has already been imprisoned, for no crime, about nine weeks, for which
he is apparently without remedy.
82. Eg., Wolck v. Weedin, 58 F.2d 928, 930-31 (9th Cir. 1932); Caranica v. Nagle, 28
F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 227 U.S. 589 (1928); United States ex rel Ross v.
Wallis, 279 F. 401, 403-04 (2d Cir. 1922); United States ex rel Janavaris v. Nicolls, 47 F.
Supp. 201, 203 (D. Mass. 1942).
83. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 235. See also Kusman v. District Director of Immigration,
117 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (post-Immigration Act case).
84. See cases cited supra note 82. It has been suggested that these federal court decisions
may have prompted the creation of the six-month limitation for the detention of deportable
aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1976). Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 793.
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this country.85 In the absence of precise and uncontroverted statutory or
case authority on the issue of indeterminate detention of an excluded
alien,86 it is necessary to determine whether there are any other sources of
legal principles which may guide United States courts. International law,
in particular, is a part of United States law which federal courts must as-
certain and apply in appropriate cases.87 It provides guarantees of various
rights of the individual against governmental or state violation. 8
C International Human Rights Law in United States Courts. Impact of
Filartiga
International law has traditionally governed relations between and
among states rather than between the individual and the state. In recent
years, however, international organizations, corporations, and individuals
have increasingly gained rights and duties of their own under international
law. 89
In the United States, the role of international law is reflected by the
Supreme Court's acceptance of the doctrine of incorporation, which recog-
nizes international law as a part of the law of the land.9" Under this doc-
trine, courts will resort to pertinent rules of customary international law
only when there is "no applicable rule of domestic law already established
by previous executive or legislative act [including a treaty] or judicial
85. Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 795.
86. Rodriguez-Fernandez, 634 F.2d at 1385.
87. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388
(1815); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
88. The Rodriguez-Fernandez case demonstrated the applicability of international law
in United States courts, especially where no substantive rule of domestic law exists on an
issue which has been addressed by international law. The district court, in Rodriguez-Fer-
nandez, based its holding exclusively on international legal protections against arbitrary de-
tention. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit also used these international legal principles to support its holding.
89. See, e.g., Note, The Alien Tort Statute: Implications of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 15
GA. L. REV. 504, 505-08 (1981).
90. Id See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876,
880-81; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, A TREATISE 39-41 (1955); I. BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 51-53 (1973); W. TUNG, INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN AN ORGANIZING WORLD 6-7 (1978). Incorporation has also been referred to as the "im-
plementation" of international law by national law. See H. KESSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 291-93 (1966). Art. 1, § 8, ci. 10 of the United States Constitution recognizes
international law as part of the law of the land by authorizing Congress to punish offenses
against international law. The doctrine of incorporation is recognized by many states today,
evidencing itself in "both constitutions and decisions of national tribunals." W. TUNG,
supra, at 6.
[Vol. 31:335
Excluded Alien's Rights
decision." 9
The seminal decision of The Paquete Habana9 2 defined the circum-
stances under which international law would be controlling on a United
States court. 9 3 In The Paquete Habana, two fishing smacks, operated and
owned by Spanish subjects of Cuban birth, were stopped while fishing off
the coast of Cuba. The vessels were taken to Key West and, after having
been condemned as prizes of war, were sold at auction.94 The Court traced
the historical ripening of the rule of international law which exempts fish-
ing vessels from capture as prizes of war,95 stating that international law is
a part of United States law and must be ascertained and administered by
United States courts.96 According to the Court, in the absence of a treaty, a
controlling executive or legislative act, or a judicial decision, courts must
resort to customary international law, evidence of which may be found in
the works of authoritative jurists and commentators. 97
Most current international human rights law98 has developed very re-
cently. Its first significant breakthrough came at the close of World War II,
when the international community began establishing norms in this area of
law.99 However, the United States has ratified very few international
human rights agreements, ° and courts are not technically required to up-
91. N. LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 9
(1973).
92. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
93. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880-81.
94. 175 U.S. at 678-79.
95. N. LEECH, supra note 91, at 6-7.
96. 175 U.S. at 700.
97. As the Court stated:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right de-
pending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose,
where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as
evidence of these, to the works ofjurists and commentators, who by years of labor,
research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the
subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not
for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
1d
This ruling was recently applied in Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880-81, 887.
98. International human rights law is the body of international law which governs
human rights. Human rights are "rights against society as represented by government and its
officials." 14 L. HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 1-2 (1978).
99. Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 795 (quoting Stotzky, Lawyer of the Americas (Book
Commentary), 11 MIAMI J. INT'L L. 229 (1979)); see also Note, supra note 89, at 505.
100. It has been thoughtfully argued that the United States-which views itself as the
"model protector of human rights," and whose Constitution is an exemplar of protection
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hold these unratified documents as binding United States law.' 0 '
In addition to ratified treaties and international agreements, another
source of international law is customary law. To become customary law, a
rule of conduct must command "the general assent of civilized nations."' °2
For example, while the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the
Organization of American States are not considered self-executing human
rights treaties,'0 3 courts have used their provisions as evidence of binding
principles of customary international law."
The recently decided case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala'015 exemplifies the
implementation of customary international law in a United States court. In
this case, two citizens of Paraguay brought an action in a United States
court against a Paraguayan official for the wrongful death of their son and
from arbitrary governmental encroachment upon human rights-sees international human
rights as an area which only other countries need to address and to commit themselves:
Because we believe that human rights in the United States need no international
support; because we do not think we have anything to learn in human rights from
others and we even fear dilution or 'contamination' from them; because though we
continue to assert that human rights are everybody's business, we make an excep-
tion where those of our own citizens are concerned; because we have always re-
mained in some measure 'isolationist,' especially resisting foreign 'interference'
here; because we fear that foreign scrutiny might bring subversion, distortion, or
hostile propaganda-the United States has refused to be a full and equal partici-
pant in the international human rights program. Most glaringly, it has adhered to
virtually no human rights agreement of any importance.
L. HENKIN, supra note 98, at 118. See also, Stotzky, supra note 99, at 238.
101. Under the Constitution, United States treaties are part of the "Supreme Law of the
Land," but ratification by two-thirds of the Senate is required before they become United
States domestic law. U.S. CoNsT. art. 6; U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2.
One ratified treaty is the United Nations Charter, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945). In this document,
the United States pledges itself, as a U.N. member, "to promote . . . universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms." Id at art. 55.
102. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 694; Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
103. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881-82, 882 n.9; Hitai v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
343 F.2d 466, 468 (2nd Cir. 1965). In Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952),
the Supreme Court of California held that provisions of the United Nations Charter, which
pledge the cooperation of member nations in promoting observance of fundamental free-
doms, "lack the mandatory quality and definiteness" sufficient to demonstrate an intent of
the signatory nations to create immediately enforceable rights in individuals upon ratifica-
tion. Instead, the court observed, the provisions "are framed as a promise of future action by
the member nations." Id at 724, 242 P.2d at 620-21.
104. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882 n.9; United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 277-78 (2nd
Cir. 1978). In Toscanno, the court alluded to the United Nations Charter and the Charter of
the Organization of American States as clear evidence of "a long standing principle of inter-
national law that abductions by one state of persons located within the territory of another
violate the territorial sovereignty of the second state and are redressable . Id at 278.
105. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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brother, allegedly caused by the use of torture. 1° Federal jurisdiction was
obtained under the Alien Tort Claims Statute. 10 7 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that official torture
violates established norms of the international law of human rights. '0 8 Us-
ing the methodology posited in The Paquete Habana,10 9 the court con-
cluded that the prohibition of official torture is an accepted norm of
customary international law.110
Filartiga is significant because customary international law provided the
basis for establishing that government officials can be liable in United
States courts for acts which violate individual human rights. Although the
issue with which it dealt was one of jurisdiction, Filartiga demonstrated
the potential effectiveness of relying on international law in United States
106. Id. at 878-79. Defendant/appellee was Inspector General of Police in Asuncion,
Paraguay at the time the decedent was allegedly tortured to death.
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976). The Alien Tort Claims Statute provides that federal district
courts "have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien, for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Id See Filartiga, 630 F.2d
at 885-86.
The Alien Tort Claims Statute is a telling example of Professor Henkin's view that the
United States aggressively seeks improvement of human rights conditions in other countries,
but not for itself. See supra note 100. While the United States has enacted a statute to
enable aliens to redress violations of international law or a treaty of the United States in
United States courts, it has refused to recognize the authority of non-United States tribunals
to adjudicate international law violations by American citizens, or, for that matter, any do-
mestic issue. L.,HENKIN, supra note 98, at 101. For example, the Connally Reservation,
which was passed by the United States Senate, narrowed United States acceptance of Inter-
national Court of Justice jurisdiction by withdrawing from the courts' consideration any
matter "determined by the United States" to be essentially within its domestic jurisdiction.
U.S. Dep't of State, The International Court ofJustice, 12 DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 1297, 1301
(197 1), quoted in Note, supra note 89, at 514 n.49.
108. The court identified these norms in numerous international agreements and in the
condemnation of torture as an instrument of official policy by essentially all of the countries
of the world. Contra Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
835 (1976) (excluding laws governing a state's treatment of its own citizens from application
of the law of nations through the Alien Tort Claims Statute).
109. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
110. The court ascertained that official torture violates accepted norms of international
law by consulting the works of jurists writing on public law, by the general usage and prac-
tice of nations, and by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing such law. The court
considered several sources as evidence of customary international law:
(1) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other United Nations declarations;
see 630 F.2d at 882;
(2) numerous international accords and treaties, see id at 883-84;
(3) the constitutional prohibitions of over 55 states, see id at 884;
(4) reports from the international diplomatic corps, see id; and
(5) the conclusions of international legal scholars and commentators; see id at 879 n.4,
883.
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courts in a case where there is no applicable rule of domestic law."
In Rodriguez-Fernandez, however, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit faced the issue of what rights an excluded alien can
claim against the United States government under United States domestic
law or international law. The issue in this case, like that of Filartiga, ap-
peared to be resolvable only by recourse to accepted principles of custom-
ary international law." I 2
II. RODRIGUEZ-FERNANDEZ: FILLING AN IMMIGRATION VOID
Due to his prior convictions and lack of immigration documents, Rodri-
guez-Fernandez's exclusion was properly ordered on July 21, 1980. How-
ever, because the United States government either ceased efforts or was
unable to deport him to Cuba, as the Immigration Act requires, he was
detained in federal prison for more than one year. The government ap-
pealed the district court's decision that Rodriguez-Fernandez's detention
was arbitrary and prohibited under accepted principles of international
law.' 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit construed the
Immigration Act's provisions as entitling Rodriguez-Fernandez to release
upon application, after the passage of a reasonable time to negotiate a re-
turn to his country of origin or to the transporter that brought him from
that country. "' The court found its construction to be consistent with the
Immigration Act's treatment of deportable resident aliens, federal constitu-
tional principles, and accepted international law principles entitling indi-
viduals to be free from arbitrary detention."15 Stating that the absence of
agreement by any country to take the excluded alien is insufficient reason
to continue his imprisonment,"16 the court went on to hold:
When an excludable alien in custody tests the detention by writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(9) or 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, we hold that the burden is upon the government to show
Ill. See Note, supra note 89, at 510-13.
112. Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1388.
113. Id at 1385.
114. Id at 1386, 1389-90.
115. Id. at 1390.
116. The court upheld the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (1976) for the government to
return or negotiate a return of the excluded alien to the country of origin, or to the trans-
porter from that country. 654 F.2d at 1390. However, after a "reasonable period of negotia-
tions" elapses, if the incarcerated alien wishes to risk an option to continued detention by
writ of habeas corpus, the court suggested other acceptable choices the government might
make to effect the alien's release from detention. These alternatives, the court emphasized,
include, but do not require, release within the United States. Id at 1389-90.
[Vol. 31:335
Excluded Alien's Rights
that the detention is still temporary pending expulsion, and not
simply incarceration as an alternative to departure.' 17
The court noted the lack of evidence that any negotiations were cur-
rently underway with Cuba or any other country to take Rodriguez-Fer-
nandez.' 18  This led the court to conclude that his detention was
imprisonment as an alternative to departure, rather than "temporary pend-
ing expulsion."' 19
The court found a number of other factors persuasive in rendering its
decision. It recognized that the temporary parole of excluded aliens into
the United States is now contemplated by the Immigration Act as within
the discretion of the Attorney General, 20 although parole is not consid-
ered an admission of the alien into the United States. 2 ' The court ob-
served that representatives of the Attorney General, exercising their
discretionary parole power, determined Rodriguez-Fernandez to be releas-
able under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). 122 The court appeared skeptical of the
motives for, and propriety of, a suspension of the duly-recommended re-
lease of the petitioner. 123
117. 654 F.2d at 1390.
118. Id
119. Temporary detention pending expulsion has been upheld by the Supreme Court as
a necessary part, and for the necessary purpose, of deportation. As such, it has been ruled
not to be punishment. See, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. at 537-38. See also supra notes
57-60 and accompanying text. But, when that detention proves not to be temporary but
indefinite, and under prison conditions like those endured by the petitioner, it is a form of
punishment violative of the fifth and sixth amendments.
120. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976).
121. Rodriuez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1389. In his dissenting opinion in this case, Judge
McWilliams responded by correctly construing 8 U.S.C. § 11 82(d)(5) (1976) and prior hold-
ings of the Court to conclude that the petitioner had no right to release on parole. 654 F.2d
at 1352 (McWilliams, J., dissenting). Narrowing the focus to whether the Attorney General
abused his discretion in both refusing to release Rodriguez-Fernandez on parole and order-
ing his continued detention, Judge McWilliams found no such abuse of discretion under the
circumstances. Id at 1390-91.
122. 654 F.2d at 1385. The government reported in its brief to the court the status of
Cuban refugees:
summariz[ing] Immigration and Naturalization Service status reports as follows:
Approximately 1,700 of the original 125,000 some Cuban refugees who entered the
[United States] in the spring of 1980. . . [were] detained in Atlanta as aliens con-
victed of crimes of moral turpitude. Nearly 400 previously detained criminal aliens
were released on parole under the [subsequently] suspended review and release
procedures. . . . The vast majority of the refugees [had] been released into the
United States on parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) [as of May 4, 1981]."
654 F.2d at 1385 n.l. The court stated: "[W]e note that, under procedures approved by the
predecessor to the present Attorney General, this petitioner was found to be qualified for
such parole." Id at 1390.
123. The suspension was ostensibly for the purpose of permitting a review of government
policies under the new Reagan Administration. 654 F.2d at 1385. On April 22, 1981, the
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As a basis for its analysis of the petitioner's detention, the court carefully
considered the statement in Leng May Ma v. Barber121 of Supreme Court
Justice Tom Clark (the Attorney General during the formation of the pres-
ent Immigration Act) that "[p]hysical detention . . . is now the exception
• . . and is generally employed only as to security risks or those likely to
abscond."'125 It noted the lack of evidence of "a significant number of ex-
cludable aliens" having been physically detained for lengthy periods prior
to the instant case. 126
Additionally, the court emphasized that it would not set a specific time
limit for detention. Instead, it held that the standard "of a reasonable pe-
riod of negotiations" was appropriate.I27 Further, the court refused to con-
strue the Immigration Act to require release within the United States.' 21
Instead, while maintaining that this was an option for which Rodriguez-
Fernandez was found qualified, 29 the court discussed other options avail-
able to the government, such as returning him to the vessel that brought
him,' 30 or sending him "to a country other than Cuba, if Cuba will not
take him."'' The court's decision not to set rigid guidelines for govern-
district court was told that the President had appointed a special task force to file a report on
May 4, 1981, to address what should be done with the excluded aliens still being detained.
The government requested that the court grant it another 60 days either to deport or to
parole Rodriguez-Fernandez. On April 23, the court denied the request and ordered Rodri-
guez-Fernandez's release to the sponsorship of a citizen living in Kansas City. The govern-
ment appealed these orders. Id
On May 12, 1981, a panel of the court of appeals considered another request by the gov-
ernment for more time. "The government attorneys. . . wanted additional time to develop a
solution. The period we have needed for research and deliberation has given the government
significant additional time. . . . [W]e must now determine this controversy." Id
124. 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
125. 654 F.2d at 1389.
126. Id The court was probably aware that this factor could be a reason for the failure of
the statutes to address the issue of permissible length of detention of excluded aliens. As the
district court stated in its opinion: "It seems. . . plausible that statutory guidance as to the
permissible length of administrative detention is lacking because the present situation has
not been a common occurrence." Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 792.
127. Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1389.
128. Id at 1390.
129. Id
130. Id
131. Id This sensible view has now found judicial acceptance, although it is contrary to
the letter of the immigration statute. The Immigration Act unequivocally states that the
Attorney General should deport the excluded alien to the country "whence he came." 8
U.S.C. § 1227 (1976). However, as early as Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), the
Supreme Court, faced with attempts by an alien respondent to gain entry to a large number
of disinterested countries, expressed no opposition to this alternative as a solution to the
intractable problem of deporting the otherwise undeportable, excluded alien. Id at 208-09.
Unfortunately, more often than not, disinterested countries have been less than willing to
relieve the United States of its excluded aliens. In the words of a United States District
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ment enforcement of immigration laws reflects an understanding of the
need for a degree of flexibility in handling difficult individual cases of ex-
cluded aliens.
The court disposed of the appeal by construing the Immigration Act to
require Rodriguez-Fernandez's release, but recognized the need "to dis-
cuss the serious constitutional questions involved if the statute were con-
strued differently."' 32 The court concluded from an examination of Wong
Wing 3 3 and related cases that "it would appear that an excluded alien in
physical custody within the United States may not be 'punished' without
being accorded the substantive and procedural due process guarantees of
the Fifth Amendment."' 4 Citing Carlson v. Landon,3 5 the court observed
that, if not for the fiction that detention is a continuation of exclusion,
imprisonment in a federal prison of one neither convicted nor charged
with a criminal offense would constitute a deprivation of liberty violative
of the fifth amendment.1 6 The Rodriguez-Fernandez court properly inter-
preted the language of Carlson and analogized detention pending deporta-
tion to incarceration pending trial,137 justifying detention "only as a
necessary temporary measure."'' 38 It reasoned that if there were no trial
and the petitioner were ordered to a definite term of penitentiary confine-
ment, such action would compel the courts to apply Wong Wing and deter-
mine the imprisonment to be "impermissible punishment rather than
detention pending deportation."'' 39 The court cited Petition of Brooks"4
and United States ex rel Ross v. Wallis' 4 for the proposition that deten-
tion for more than a few months constitutes imprisonment.'42 Although
Court judge, an excluded alien detainee "is unlikely to be able to make arrangements to
emigrate and settle elsewhere while his return address is an American penitentiary." Soroa-
Gonzales v. Civiletti, 515 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 n.1.5 (N.D. Ga. 1981). The United States
government, cognizant of the statutory guidelines as well as the minimal chance of success
of deporting to a disinterested country, has not found this option one that is worth pursuing
aggressively.
132. 654 F.2d at 1386.
133. 163 U.S. 228 (1895).
134. 654 F.2d at 1387, ctng United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1979), the
court agreed with the holding in that case "that no distinction can be drawn in application of
these [due process] rules between an alien like Rodriguez-Fernandez and one who is a resi-
dent in the United States." 654 F.2d at 1387 n.3.
135. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
136. 654 F.2d at 1387.
137. Id
138. Id
139. Id
140. 5 F.2d 238 (D. Mass. 1925).
141. 279 F. 401 (2d Cir. 1922).
142. Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1387-88.
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these cases concerned deportable aliens, they occurred before the enact-
ment of the Immigration Act and its precursor, The Internal Security Act
of 1950,143 and therefore the aliens involved were, like today's excluded
aliens, also unprotected by a statutory time limitation on detention. The
law prior to Rodriguez-Fernandez, as represented by the above cases and
the language of the current Immigration Act, has clearly recognized a gen-
eral rule that detention pending deportation is to be of a temporary nature.
Both the majority and the dissent recognized the importance of Shaugh-
nessy v. Mezei'" with respect to the government's case.' 45 Initially, Mezei
would seem to control the result of the instant case. However, upon close
examination, several distinguishing characteristics appear between the two
cases. In Mezei, the excluded alien was confined to Ellis Island for twenty-
one months before the Supreme Court decided his case. 146 The Court re-
fused to require his release within the United States.' 47 The majority in
Rodriguez-Fernandez cited numerous factual distinctions between the in-
stant case and Mezei to support its view that "constitutional problems in-
here in petitioner's detention status."14 8 Mezei's primary focus was on the
petitioner's right to a due process hearing regarding his right to reenter the
United States, 49 not on the constitutionality of indefinite detention as an
alternative to deportation under the circumstances of the petitioner's
case. 150
Another distinguishing factor in Mezei was that the petitioner was ex-
cluded as a security risk at the time of the Korean War.15' The court in
Rodriguez-Fernandez noted that "security risks and enemy aliens during
wartime have always been treated specially."' 52 The Mezei Court stated
that temporary parole was not applicable in that case because there was no
authority under the statute in force at that time to release nonresident
aliens. 15 3 However, at the time of Rodriguez-Fernandez, unlike when
Mezei was decided thirty years ago, the statutory authority to parole ex-
cluded aliens does exist.' 54 The Court in Mezei further stated that an ex-
143. Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987 (1950) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22 &
50 U.S.C) (amended by Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 831 (1952)).
144. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
145. 654 F.2d at 1388, 1391 n.2.
146. 345 U.S. at 209.
147. Id at 215.
148. 654 F.2d at 1388-89.
149. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212. See also Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1388.
150. See 654 F.2d at 1389; Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 791.
151. Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1388.
152. Id
153. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215-16, 216 n.14.
154. See Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 795; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976).
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clusion proceeding based on danger to national security lacked the
rationale to parole detained aliens.' During Rodriguez-Fernandez's de-
tention, however, the country was neither at war nor in a state of siege
which would warrant, as part of a heightened national security posture, the
indeterminate detention of excludable aliens. Moreover, Rodriguez-Fer-
nandez's prior convictions for escape from a Cuban prison and attempted
burglary make him at best a questionable threat to United States national
security.'5'
The standard that the court has applied of continuing detention and de-
nying temporary parole only to those excluded and deportable aliens who
are truly "security risks" or "likely to abscond"' 57 seems the proper test.
That there is little statutory support for this test is not surprising given the
demonstrated inability of the Immigration Act to adequately address par-
ticular immigration problems which have arisen since its enactment. This
test satisfies the essential requirement of protecting the citizenry and the
general public welfare while at the same time advancing the rationale for
parole to avoid the needless, punitive confinement of aliens.' 5 s Further-
more, the policy underlying this test reflects this country's ideals of respect
for individual human rights and of general fairness and justice,' 59 and is in
keeping with the American tradition of serving as a refuge for disadvan-
taged immigrants.'6
The court went on to distinguish the conditions of Mezei's confinement
in a temporary haven on Ellis Island from those of Rodriguez-Fernandez's
detention or imprisonment in two maximum security prisons.' 61 The con-
ditions of detention in Rodriguez-Fernandez were far more like those of
Wong Wing than of Mezei, in that they were similar to conditions of im-
155. 345 U.S. at 216.
156. Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 795. The district court indicated that the government
never established a national security interest as being at stake in a judicial determination of
this case. From apparent State Department and Immigration and Naturalization Service
lack of interest, the court concluded that a covert threat to national security was not the
situation presented here, but rather, this was a situation in which "established immigration
laws ... provide no direct solution." Id at 795 n. 1.
157. As for Rodriguez-Fernandez's likelihood of absconding, he indicated that he would
like to reside here permanently as a resident alien. See id at 789. See also infra note 169 and
accompanying text. He originally applied for political asylum in the United States. More-
over, given his lack of immigration documents and criminal record, it would be very difficult
for him to find a home elsewhere.
158. Leng May Mfa, 357 U.S. at 190.
159. See generally id; Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1388; Fernandez-Roque V.
Smith, 91 F.R.D. 239, 243 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Soroa- Gonzales, 515 F. Supp. at 1051; Fernan-
dez, 505 F. Supp. at 799.
160. See supra note 1.
161. Rodiguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1388.
1982]
Catholic University Law Review
prisonment for the conviction of felonies in the United States. 162
Rodriguez-Fernandez's "long record of criminality" is emphasized by
the dissent as a justification for his detention to continue in a maximum
security prison. 163 Distinguishing Mezei, the dissent indicated that, unlike
Rodriguez-Fernandez, Mezei had no criminal record to justify the same
conditions of detention. Nevertheless, this assertion is undermined by the
unsupported conclusion that "the conviction of a crime of a moral turpi-
tude parallels the determination that an alien is a national security risk as
a ground for exclusion." In effect, the dissent likened an alien convicted
of attempted burglary and escape in Cuba to an alien determined to be a
national security risk in this country. The Immigration Act lists thirty-one
distinct classes of excludable aliens.' 65 Other than the fact that they are
both statutory grounds for exclusion, the dissent related the two classes in
Mezei and Rodriguez-Fernandez through an unsupported assertion. This
attempt to link petitioner's grounds for exclusion with those of a national
security risk is clearly inadequate for the purpose of denying him parole
into the United States.
The dissent also gives much credence to Rodriguez-Fernandez's convic-
tions for "crimes involving moral turpitude" as a reason for denying the
petitioner parole.' 66 While the dissent fails to mention the actual crimes
for which the petitioner was convicted, it compares the facts in the instant
case to the hypothetical situation of Rodriguez-Fernandez having been
convicted of murder. While the continued detention of a convicted mur-
derer would surely be a legitimate example of a national security risk, to
classify a person having prior convictions for petty theft, attempted bur-
glary, and escape as a national security risk, without apparently consider-
ing the nature of the crimes and the surrounding circumstances, 67 is both
unjust and a distortion of the Leng May Ma standard for parole. A funda-
mental weakness of the dissent is its failure to adequately demonstrate that
the petitioner, although properly excluded for prior convictions, is a na-
tional security risk and thus not qualified for parole within the United
States.
A further distinction between the cases is that in Mezei there were con-
tinuing efforts to deport the alien and that he finally terminated his search
162. Rodriguez-Fernandez served more than one year in maximum security federal pris-
ons; Wong Wing was sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for one year.
163. Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1390-91.
164. Id at 1391 n.2.
165. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(31) (1976). See, e.g., supra note 9.
166. Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1390-91.
167. See supra note 23.
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for a new home voluntarily.'68 It is worth noting that Mezei not only
sought release from confinement, but unlike Rodriguez-Fernandez, he also
sought admission to the United States.'69
The dissenting opinion makes no mention of the lack of continuing ef-
forts to deport Rodriguez-Fernandez. Those efforts were present in Mezei,
a case upon which the dissent heavily relies. Indeed, it has been shown that
detention is a necessary incident of exclusion, but it must be only tempo-
rary pending deportation of the alien.' 7 ° The dissent fails to address the
critical issue that detention of an excluded alien may become impermissi-
ble punishment under the Immigration Act and the common law if efforts
to deport the alien cease and detention is no longer necessary for
deportation.
After distinguishing the facts of Mezei, the court in Rodriguez-Fernandez
made reference to recently-expanded constitutional protections owed
aliens apart from any right to enter or remain in the United States.' 7' The
court determined that due process is subject to change "to take into ac-
count accepted current notions of fairness."' 172 The many factual differ-
168. 654 F.2d at 1388.
169. Id "Petitioner testified he is'willing to go to another country, 'anywhere in the
world where I'll not be a prisoner unjustly or unfairly."' Id at 1386.
170. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
171. 654 F.2d at 1388.
172. Id In spite of its recognition of the plenary power of Congress to expel or exclude
aliens, the Supreme Court has held that this power is still subject to judicial intervention if it
violates the Constitution. See Carlson, 342 U.S. at 537. Recently, the Court has repeatedly
emphasized the doctrine that not only is the availability of pretrial review presumed when
constitutional questions are at issue, but that the Court will not read a statutory scheme to
take the extraordinary step of foreclosing review unless Congress' intent to do so is mani-
fested by "clear and convincing" evidence. E.g., Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109
(1976); Weinberger v. Sarf, 422 U.S. 749, 762 (1975); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-
67 (1974).
There is no specific statutory provision granting (or prohibiting) the federal courts author-
ity to review an Immigration and Naturalization Service district director's decision whether
or not to grant parole to an alien determined to be excludable by an administrative law
judge. Soroa-Gonzales v. Civiletti, 515 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (N.D. Ga. 1981). However, the
courts have found adequate jurisdiction for such cases under general jurisdictional provi-
sions. Id at 1054. For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1976) provides the United States district
courts with jurisdiction of all civil and criminal actions under Title II of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1151 (1976). Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 grants the district courts "original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution laws or treaties of the United States."
Finally, the federal courts may grant writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976).
515 F. Supp. at 1055-56. In Soroa-Gonzales, the court found it had jurisdiction of the peti-
tioner's habeas corpus action challenging his indefinite detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(1976), out of the utmost respect traditionally accorded the Great Writ, which "shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, quoted in Soroa-Gonzales, 515 F. Supp. at 1056. See also Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-426 (1963). The Soroa-Gonzales court indicated that the attendant
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ences between Mezei and Rodriguez-Fernandez demonstrate that standards
of fairness do change, and have changed, significantly over time.
The court also considered international law principles as a source for
standards of fairness as to the propriety of holding aliens in detention. 173 It
determined that "[n]o principle of international law is more fundamental
than the concept that human beings should be free from arbitrary impris-
onment."' 74 While not grounding its decision solely in international law,
the court gave international law considerable weight as a factor in resolv-
ing the issues presented in Rodriguez-Fernandez. This use of international
law by the court is significant because it represents recognition by the
United States courts of the need to adhere to pertinent international legal
principles that have won the acceptance of a broad majority of the interna-
tional community. '75
The court thus found that Mezei did not control a resolution of the con-
stitutional problems of Rodriguez-Fernandez's detention. In so doing, the
court exercised its duty to see that individuals, including aliens, are not
unreasonably subjected to an unrestricted governmental discretion, even if
authorized or apparently authorized by Congress.1
76
problems of the sudden influx of 130,000 Cubans ideally should have been addressed by the
executive or the legislative branches. 515 F. Supp. at 1051. In light of the lack of government
action to parole those Cubans detained solely on the basis of lack of proper entry papers, the
court asserted its obligation to issue a writ of habeas corpus under the circumstances. Id at
1051-52.
It has been observed that while due process must change with the circumstances of a given
situation, the judiciary must determine if the handling of an immigration case has been
consistent with due process, rather than ignore its obligation in the name of an omnipotent
and unaccountable Congress. See Hart, supra note 16, at 1393-94.
173. 654 F.2d at 1388. The court deemed international law principles a proper source
since the Supreme Court, in Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), used the same source to
support its upholding of Congress' plenary power over exclusion and deportation of aliens.
654 F.2d at 1388.
174. 654 F.2d at 1388.
175. By extending constitutional protection primarily through the interpretation of do-
mestic law, this decision has a more powerful impact upon the rights of excluded aliens
under United States law than it would have if it had established rights exclusively through a
construction of international law. A due process right of excluded aliens may prevail over
conflicting statutes and case law-as Rodriguez-Fernandez has demonstrated. International
human rights law, however, if not adopted in the form of self-executing treaty provisions,
holds no such exalted status in United States courts. It cannot prevail over conflicting do-
mestic statutes and judicial decisions, as shown by the Paquete Habana methodology and
United States adoption of the incorporation doctrine. See supra notes 90-91, 97 and accom-
panying text.
176. See Hart, supra note 16, at 1390, 1393.
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III. RODRIGUEZ-FERNANDEZ: A LESSON IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
POLITICAL "PLENARY POWER"
The Rodriguez-Fernandez case has an important effect upon the consti-
tutional status of the excluded alien. While no specific time limit has been
set upon his detention, 77 the right of the excluded alien to be free from
indefinite detention pending deportation has been upheld. This right may
be tested by the alien willing to risk one of the various alternatives to de-
tention which may result.' 78 When the constitutionality of continuing de-
tention is challenged by an excluded alien's writ of habeas corpus, the
government now has a burden of establishing that the detention is "tempo-
rary pending expulsion and not simply incarceration as an alternative to
departure."'' 79 The effect of this burden is to ensure that excluded aliens
are not punished by imprisonment or indefinite detention because of an
inability to deport or by an abuse of discretion in denying parole within
the United States. The decision in this case has provided a standard of
fairness in the detention of excluded aliens which balances and protects
the vital interests at stake for excluded aliens, for government officials, and
for the public at large.
As a result of Rodriguez-Fernandez, judicial scrutiny of immigration
laws and their enforcement against aliens has intensified. The effect has
been quick in related immigration cases. On August 19, 1981, a federal
judge ordered the release of 226 Cubans detained for fourteen months in
Atlanta's federal penitentiary.1 80 Judicial consideration of other Cuban de-
177. This is in accordance with the statute. Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1389.
178. Id at 1389-90.
179. Id at 1390. The court indicated that information on these matters is more readily
available to the government than to excluded alien plaintiffs. Id
180. In response to a class action suit against the Justice Department, United States Dis-
trict Court Judge Marvin Shoob, on August 19, 1981, ordered the release of 226 of the 1,800
Cubans detained for 14 months in Atlanta's federal penitentiary. The Washington Post,
Aug. 19, 1981, at A26, col. 1. Id Aug. 17, 1981, at AI, col. 4. This decision occurred as the
result of the consolidation of two class actions and a single petitioner's action. See Fernan-
dez-Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 117 (N.D. Ga. 1981). The decision dealt solely with Cuban
detainees charged with exclusion or found to be excludable only on the ground of lack of
entry papers. The Eleventh Circuit has adopted a standard of review whereby it determines
whether or not the Attorney General abused his discretion in exercising his authority to
parole or not to parole. See Ahrens v. Rojas, 292 F.2d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 1951); Soroa-
Gonzales, 515 F. Supp. at 1057; Fernandez-Roque, 91 F.R.D. at 242.
Discretion is abused in this or any other immigration decision if it is made "without a
rational basis" or departs from established government policies. Soroa-Gonzales, 515 F.
Supp. at 1058. While the precise rationale for the release in Soroa-Gonzales and Fernandez-
Roque was different from that in Rodriguez-Fernandez, both Eleventh Circuit decisions sup-
ported the results they reached by reference to Rodriguez-Fernandez. See Fernandez-Roque,
91 F.R.D. at 242-43; Soroa-Gonzales, 515 F. Supp. at 1051-53 nn.l & 1.5, 1056, 1061 n.18. As
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tainee cases has continued on the basis of the severity of prior
convictions. '8 1
On another level, this case will join Filartiga in opening the courts to
possible future litigation concerning human rights violations which cannot
be challenged by directly-pertinent United States domestic law. Further-
more, Rodriguez-Fernandez demonstrates the capacity of a resourceful ju-
diciary to defend unprotected or vulnerable minority rights against
infringement by the political branches. The court accomplished this largely
by the use of analogical reasoning. It established new law from constitu-
tional principles of prior law and related statutory principles concerning
the rights of deportable aliens, supported by accepted international legal
principles.' 8 2
in Rodriguez-Fernandez, both decisions applied the Leng May Ma test to determine whether
or not Cuban detainees should be paroled. Soroa-Gonzales, 515 F. Supp. at 1060-61; Fernan-
dez-Rogue 91 F.R.D. at 239, 243. In Fernandez-Roque, the court concluded that further
detention of 226 Cuban refugees with "no history of criminality," already detained for 15
months, does not reflect "the humane qualities of an enlightened civilization." Id. at 243.
The court continued, stating that:
[C]ontinued detention of persons (1) unlikely to be excluded back to Cuba any
time in the near future; (2) unlikely to abscond; (3) not a threat to the national
security; (4) not a threat to the public interest; (5) who have committed no crimes
here; and (6) who were invited here by the President, is simply incarceration for an
indefinite period as an alternative to departure and constitutes an abuse of discre-
tion of the parole authority.
Id. (citing Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981)).
An official in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia re-
cently reported the contents of a government status report on all Cuban detainees who have
been or are now held in the Atlanta federal penitentiary. As of January 22, 1982, 587 of an
estimated total Cuban detainee population of 1,885 had been released. Of a remaining 1,298
Cuban detainees, 400 had been approved for release by the government but were awaiting
the assignment of sponsors. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (I.N.S.) Commis-
sioner in Washington had determined that detention in 235 individual cases should con-
tinue. An additional 250 Cuban detainees, transferred to Atlanta in late January from the
closed Ft. Chaffee, Arkansas facility, would probably be released once sponsors could be
obtained for them. Telephone interview with official of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia (Feb. 5, 1982). At long last, these figures and reports indi-
cate a bona fide government effort to approve the parole of those excluded Cubans who
present no threat to national security or the public interest, who are unlikely to abscond, and
who would otherwise be subject to indefinite detention. Undoubtedly, Rodriguez-Fernandez
and the Atlanta district court decisions have accounted for the sudden and dramatic increase
in parole decisions of many Cuban detainees and have otherwise provided a forceful impe-
tus for expeditious and thorough government review for possible parole in the other individ-
ual cases.
181. The Washington Post, Aug. 7, 198,1, at A4, col. 1.
182. Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1390.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Rodriguez-Fernandez court recognized the importance of settling
the unresolved question of "punishment" of excluded aliens. The lengthy,
indefinite imprisonment of Rodriguez-Fernandez and many hundreds of
other excluded aliens occurred because of a loosely-drafted statute in an
area of immigration law that had not been carefully scrutinized by the
federal judiciary prior to this case. The excluded alien is now better pro-
tected against the abuse of detention within the exclusion process, an abuse
which had previously been allowed through the use of legal fictions that
afforded the government great freedom to act and effectively increased the
likelihood of mistreatment.' 83 One of the alternatives to continued deten-
tion outlined by the court will ultimately have to be chosen by the govern-
ment as an alternative to punishment without judicial review.' 84 The
burden the court has set on the government to show that detention is in
fact temporary when detention is challenged by habeas corpus proceedings
has in the past and should continue to encourage the government's timely
implementation of one of these alternatives before judicial proceedings ac-
tually begin. Above all, Rodriguez-Fernandez firmly establishes the exist-
ence of the due process rights of every alien, even those of the excluded
alien, before he may be punished under our laws.
Douglas G. Bonner, III
183. Id at 1387.
184. See id at 1390.
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